Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 1994

Global Migration - Immigration - Multiethnicity: Challenges to the
Concept of the Nation-State
Jost Delbruck
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Delbruck, Jost (1994) "Global Migration - Immigration - Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept of the
Nation-State," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol2/iss1/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized
editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more
information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Global Migration-Immigration-Multiethnicity:
Challenges to the Concept of the Nation-State
JOST DELBROCK"

Professor Delbriick begins his article by briefly discussing the
history and development of the nation-state,and then examines how
changes in the politicaland social environment, often international
and cross-culturalin nature, have altered the traditionalnotion of
the nation-state. He argues that the modern form of the State
should be based on the concept of the "Open Republic," ratherthan
on that of the traditional closed, self-centered, and self-reliant
nation-state. Professor Delbriick demands that his concept of an
"Open Republic" first be grounded in the form of a republican
State-a constitutional government involving the democratic
participation of all citizens and a "marketplace of ideas." He
focuses on a republic geared in nature and character toward an
"openness" to accepting and assimilating citizens of different
ethnic, religious, or cultural backgrounds, with equal rights for
those diverse citizens. He concludes that such an "Open Republic"
is suited to preserving a nationalpublic interest, while at the same
time meeting the global challenges of the present andfuture.

I. INTRODUCTION
Presently, we can observe a growing concern about the future of the
traditional concept of the nation-state. Politicians are becoming concerned
about a serious loss of State authority and power, both externally and
internally. Indeed, there are indications that could suggest that the nationstate, the universally realized form of political organization of societies
(people), -may become obsolete. The first development that may justify
doubt as to the persistence of the State concerns the diminishing relevance
of State power. and authority. With regard to the external dimension of
Statehood, one may well ask whether the concept of the State is still

* Professor of German Constitutional Law, International Law, and European Union Law,
Christian-Albrechts-Universitit, Kiel, Germany; Visiting Professor of International and European Union
Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. Dr.Iur.Habil, Kiel, 1971; LL.M., Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington, 1960.
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adequate and viable in an era of regional institutional integration and
globalization of most of the essential fields of State responsibility.' Instead,
globalization' may well require new concepts or blueprints of political
organization.
Internally, a second development affecting the traditional concept of the
State concerns the notion of the "permanent" population as the second of the
three elements forming a State (a defined territory, a permanent population,
and an effective government).'
Except in the traditional immigration
countries, the "permanent population," or the State people-nation
("Staatsvolk"), of most of the European States has been defined in an
ethnically or culturally homogeneous way.4 With the change of many
European nations into de facto immigration countries,5 the traditional
understanding of what constitutes the "nation" or the "State people" is no
longer tenable. The question is, can a nation as a human substrate of
Statehood be molded and integrated apart from common ethnicity, language,
history, and culture? If not, that is, if a State in order to remain a State
proper must depend on such integrating principles, would not the traditional

I. Concerns of this kind motivated a number of private individuals in Germany to bring the law
approving Germany's adherence to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 before the German Constitutional
Court. The Court upheld the law but indicated that any further transfers of sovereign powers to the
European Union would need the consent of the German pouvoir constituant (i.e., the people), which
means that further transfers of essential sovereign powers could not be effected by simple constitutional
amendment. For the English translation of the decision of the Constitutional Court of Oct. 12, 1993, see
Germany: Federal Constitutional Court Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, Oct. 12, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 388 (1994).
2. Globalization means the denationalization of politics, markets, and law, and even in some
instances the transfer of State powers to supranational institutions (which are not and will not become
proper States).
On "globalization," see Jost Delbrfick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and
Markets-Implicationsfor Domestic Law-A European Perspective, I IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9,
10-11 (1993).
3. See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat.
3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 21, 25.
4. In the case of Germany, this ethnically informed notion of the State people has been
emphasized by the German Constitutional Court in a decision holding as unconstitutional some state laws
extending to alien citizens from European Community (EC) countries the right to vote in municipal
elections. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Constitutional Court Reporter) 83 BVerfGE
37, 50-59.
5. There is a voluminous literature on the migration-immigration issue. For the German

perspective,

see DEUTSCHE IM AUSLAND-FREMDE IN DEUTSCHLAND: MIGRATION IN GESCHICHTE UND
GEGENWART (Klaus J. Bade ed., 1992); A. MOhlum, Armutswanderung, Asyl und Abwehrverhalten.
Globale und nationale Dilemmata, B7 Aus POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE-BEILAGE ZUR
WOCHENZEITUNG DAS PARLAMENT 3 (1993) (with further references).
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concept of the State be anachronistic or outmoded in view of the de facto
growing heterogeneity of the populations of the existing State entities?
The first part of this paper will address the history of the concept of the
nation-state, particularly the concept of the State nation ("Staatsvolk"). It
will be shown that the concept of the nation, as coined in the course of the
French Revolution, developed in two distinct ways-the ethnically oriented
way (see Herder's notions of the "Volk" and the "Volksgeist" 6 ) and the
politically and culturally oriented way (see the French notion of the "grande
nation" and the U.S. notion of the multiethnic "political nation").
The second part of this paper will address the changing political and
social environment that seriously challenges the State's ability to sustain its
traditional status and self-understanding. This paper will argue that the State
as the dominant form of political organization and the accepted object of
identification of peoples is not obsolete. When considering State theory,
however, one has to rethink constitutive elements of the traditional concept
of the State. 7 The form of future States should be based on the concept of
the "Open Republic," as distinct from the "closed," self-centered, and selfreliant nation-state.
The third part of this paper will address the concept of the "Open
Republic, ' in particular how it relates to the historical republican paradigm,
and whether that is still valid or can or should be adjusted to modem
conditions of political society. This part will also address the question as
to whether the "Open Republic" can mold an "open" nation or State people
that will be integrated under or around a modernized "republican idea," yet
at the same time will be diversified ethnically, culturally, religiously, or on
the basis of other similar criteria.

6. For a summary of Herder, Schelling, and Fichte's impact on European, and specifically,
German, political thought with regard to the concept of the nation ("Volksbegrit'), see Gerhard Besier,
Volk (3. Zum Volksbegriff im Rationalismus des 17. Jahrhunderts bis zum Imperialismus der
Wilhelminischen Ara), in 2 EVANGELISCHES STAATSLEXIKON 3894-97 (Roman Herzog et al. eds., 3d ed.
1987).
7. For an intriguing analysis of the changing role of the sovereign State in the international
system and its impact on international law, see Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State:
Towards a New Paradigmfor InternationalLaw?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447 (1993).
8. As to the notion of the "Open Republic," see DIETER OBERNDORFER, DIE OFFENE REPUBLIK:
ZUR ZUKUNFr DEUTSCHLANDS UND EUROPAS (1991); Dieter Obemd6rfer, Politik fir eine offene
Republik: Die ideologischen, politischen und sozialen Herausforderungen einer multikulturellen
Einwanderungsgeselschaft, in DAS MANIFEST DER 60-DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE EINWANDERUNG 133
(Klaus J. Bade ed., 1994).
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The fourth and final part of this paper will show that the "Open
Republic" could, in principle, achieve the goal of providing an integrated
State on the basis of "equal citizenship" and community, as well as
individual freedom and diversity. The "Open Republic" thus constituted,
from the perspective of political integration of the citizenry, would be
capable of accommodating "others" within its realm and making them
"belonging," 9 which is essential in view of persistent global migration. The
"Open Republic" would be structurally able to participate constructively in
the emerging global order and the international communication community
because it would not be fettered by the parochial, inward-directed
perceptions of the traditional nation-state. It could focus on the international
"public interest" without losing its integrating capacity because it would not
be narrowly preoccupied with the national interest in the first place.

II.

HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE CONCEPT OF
THE NATION OR STATE PEOPLE

The modern territorial State has undergone various changes in types and
appearances. The early formative period of the territorial State was
characterized by its monarchical leadership, which was the focal point of
Statehood as expressed by the absolutist formula "1'6tat c'est moi."' 0 The
next stage of development of the territorial State saw the gradual
differentiation and separation of the institutions of government from the
monarch as a person. This development is graphically described by the
formula allegedly uttered by Frederic II of Prussia, who considered himself
"the first servant of his State."" In the wake of the French Revolution, the
"nation" as the sovereign bearer of State power became the focus of State
theory. This theory attempts to explain the nature of the territorial State
which, in the nineteenth century, came to perfection as the dominant form
of political organization of peoples living permanently in a defined territory.

9. See KENNETH
CONSTITUTION (1989).

KARST, BELONGING

TO AMERICA:

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP

AND THE

10. The "l'6tat c'est moi" statement is ascribed to the French absolutist monarch Louis XIV
(1638-1715); see OTTO KIMMINICH, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 247 (2d ed. 1987).
11. See id. The Prussian King's phrase is cited by Immanuel Kant in his famous essay "On
Perpetual Peace," see Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden. Erster Definitivartikel zum Ewigen Frieden,
in I I SCHRIFTEN ZUR ANTHROPOLOGIE, GESCHICHTSPHILOSOPHIE, POLITIK UND PADAGOGIK,
WERKAUSGABE 195, 207 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1977).

1994]

CHALLENGES TO THE NATION-STATE

The then-current perception of the nation was expressed in Article 3 of the
Dclarationdes Droits de 1'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789.2

One may wonder why the French revolutionaries chose the term
"nation" to signify the bearer of the sovereign power of the young French
Republic. The term does not seem to square well with the revolutionaries'
belief in universal human rights and rights of citizens as presented in the
Declaration. The notion of the human person and the citoyen as the subject
of universal human rights is derived from the philosophy of the
Enlightenment. This notion belongs to the concept of the Kantian Republic,
which internally is focused on the lawfully constituted society and the
protection of human rights, and which externally is aimed at a World Order
of Republican States. 3 From this perspective, "citizenry," as the lawfully
constituted society, would have clearly been the more appropriate term 4
to signify the bearer of State power. The revolutionaries' choice of the term
"nation" for this purpose was, however, not accidental. Rather, it is a
recognition of the fact that the "nation" was not only the concept of
universal human rights as developed by the Enlightenment, which led to the
notion of the nation and the modernizing territorial State; but also that the
ideas of the French Revolution were perceived as the specific "mission" of
the French nation. These ideas gave the French nation a distinct power
politics momentum and integrated the French people into the French State
Nation. 5 This missionary self-perception of the French nation provided
an overwhelming thrust in the Napoleonic wars. It also inspired the other
European States in their resistance against the onslaught of the French
armies. The idea of national unity organized in the territorial nation-state
became the leading paradigm of the emerging international system.
However, it became subject to different interpretations and ways of political
implementation.

12. See Diclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, in LA DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN ET LA JURISPRUDENCE 249 (Colloque des 25 et 26 mai 1989 au Conseil

Constitutionnel 1989).
13. See Kant, supra note 11,at 204.
14. In calling the term "citizenry" more "appropriate," this author opts for an understanding of
"citizenry" that is informed by the notion of a "moderated government" in contrast to the "volont6
g~n~rale" oriented understanding of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See Donald L. Horowitz, Immigration and
Group Relations in France and America, in IMMIGRANTS IN TWO DEMOCRACIES: FRENCH AND
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 3, 7-18 (Donald L. Horowitz & G6rard Noiriel eds., 1992).
15. See I FELIX ERMACORA, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 61 (1970).

50
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In Germany, then still divided into thirty-nine different sovereign
territorial entities, the national ambitions of the bourgeoisie were frustrated
by the decision of the Congress of Vienna not to establish a German nationstate. The German Federation (Deutscher Bund) of 1815 was a federation
of sovereign States mostly committed to the goal of restoring the old
monarchical order, albeit in a slightly modified version. Thus, there was no
politically viable way of adopting the French model of nation-building on
the level of a united Germany. However, the national dream had a strong
influence on German thinking. This influence took two different courses,
which eventually merged towards the end of the nineteenth century when
German unity ultimately came about. On the one hand, under the influence
of the Romantic movement, the frustrated national ambitions turned to
building a backward-oriented national myth of German glory from the times
of the Germanic tribes onward. 6 On the other hand, in view of the lack
of politically real nation-building, the idea of the nation was combined with
that of the "Volk" (i.e., the German people), and thereby acquired a distinct
ethnic meaning. This ethnic orientation is still virulent in the German
Nationality Act 17 and in Article 116 Basic Law," although Germany has
never had a completely ethnically homogeneous population.' 9
The
Nationality Act still adheres to the principle of acquiring nationality by
birth. The Basic Law defines as Germans those people who do not have
German nationality but who are of "German stock" and have taken domicile
in Germany after 1945.
While the German example of an ethnic perception of the concept of
nation ° is particularly instructive, not the least because the teachings of

16.

OBERNDORFER, DIE OFFENE REPUBLIK, supra note 8, at 30, speaks of an artificial, fictitious

continuity between the allegedly [Germanic] roots of the "nation" in a far distant past and the new
nation-state of 1871, which in actual history has never existed.
17.

See Reichs- und Staatsangehbrigkeitsgesetz von 1913 (originally
published in 1913

Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] 85), amended by 1993 BGBI. 11062 (June 30, 1993); see also infra pp. 55-56.
18. Article 116 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany defines German nationals
as persons who either possess German citizenship or who have been admitted to the territory of the
German Reich as a refugee or expellee of German stock as of December 31, 1937. GG art. 116.
19. Ethnic homogeneity-as expressed in the slogan "Germany to the Germans"-is a myth as
well. It is the product of an ethnonationalist integration ideology of a belated nation ("verspdtete
Nation"). On the notion of the "verspitete Nation," see HELMUT PLESSNER, DIE VERSPATETE NATION
(1962).
20. On the question of the German understanding of the concept of nation from a similar
perspective, see Jfdrgen Habermas, Anerkennungskdmpfe in: demokratischen Rechtsstaat, in
MULTIKULTURALISMUS UND DIE POLITIK DER ANERKENNUNG 147, 190 (Charles Taylor ed., 1992).
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German philosophers like Herder, Fichte, and Schelling had a major impact
on the shaping of ethnonationalism in general, Germany is not the only
country where ethnonationalism took root. It is deeply entrenched in the
minds of many European people, particularly in central, eastern, and
southeastern Europe. The political upheaval in the former Soviet Union and
in the former Yugoslavia is predominantly due to ethnonationalist and/or
religious divisions. On the other hand, the growing political cooperation
between Russia and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on historically
strong ethnic bonds between the two Slavic peoples. Even the Scandinavian
countries, albeit in a milder form, have adhered to the ethnically informed
principle of nationality by birth.
In contrast to ethnicity, another interpretation of the meaning of the
concept of nation is exemplified by the development of political thinking in
France and the United States. In France, where the concept of the nation
emerged as a powerful political idea of historical dimension, the ethnic
orientation of the term "nation" never did dominate French thinking.
Although the French nation in many ways perceived itself as exclusive and
imperial, it defined itself in political and cultural terms."
This
understanding of the nation, together with the colonial ties to overseas
countries and peoples, led to an acceptance of people of different ethnic,
religious, and cultural backgrounds as members of the French nation. Thus,
there was little or no room left for a narrow, ethnically homogeneous
perception of the French State Nation. This is clearly reflected in the
French nationality laws, which widely accepted the territorial or jus soli
principle for the acquisition of French nationality alongside the birth orjus
sanguinis principle.22
The formation of the U.S. nation-state has been different, of course,
from that of the European nations. The United States was created by
immigrants from various European countries, not by one nation or people.

Furthermore, the founding of the new independent American State preceded
the French Revolution. Thus, like the French Revolution, the political

21. ERMACORA, supra note 15, at 60. The enforcement of this concept of a politically and
culturally defined nation led, however, to the repression of ethnic minorities who only today are
beginning to articulate themselves in France rather forcefully. See Francesco Capotorti, Minderheiten,
in HANDBUCH DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN 598 (Rfldiger Wolfrum ed., 1991); see also Horowitz, supra
note 14, at 18-25.
22. On the French law of nationality and its recent development see Stephan Hobe, Law of
Asylum-A Solution to the Migration Problem? 36 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 72 (1994).
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philosophy of the new State-at least to a substantial part-was based on
the philosophy of the European political thinkers of the Enlightenment. Yet,
the American State developed and kept its own identity.23 This is also true
of the perception of the notions of "people" and "nation" despite
considerable confusion in the choice of terms denoting the notions of
"people" and "nation" that characterized U.S. political (State) theory through
the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century. With all due caution
one may say that "people," as used in the preamble of the United States
Constitution, denoted the State people or the "body politic" (i.e., the
community of citizens). "Nation," on the other hand, was used in the
English tradition to signify the empiric human substrate of the United
States.24 However, with the final territorial consolidation of the United
States through the incorporation of the western territories to the Union,25
the term "the American nation" became accepted as signifying the "body
politic" or State people.
The question then arose as to what the criteria or guiding concepts were
to determine the integration of the nation. Unanimous answers to this
question have not been given so far. Rather, the history of the formation of
the United States and its nation has been marked by sharp-and at times
even violent (for example, the Civil War)--disputes over the "right" answer
to the question of who was to form part of the nation and which criteria
were to be used. Religious, ethnic, and racial criteria for distinguishing
between the citizens "belonging to the American nation" and the "others"
marked the way of the United States into Statehood. 26 However, the
primary direction of this way was determined by the great principles
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the Constitution
of 1787: freedom and equality. There was at all times a full consensus
among those citizens already "belonging" to the nation concerning these
highest values and their constitutionally binding nature. With the help of
the courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, this consensus made it

23. With regard to the differences in French and U.S. political thinking see Horowitz, supra note
14, at 7-10.
24.

See WESTEL WILLOUGHBY, AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE STATE 9-12 (1928).

Willoughby presents an interesting and erudite discussion of the European-German and the U.S.
terminology.
25. As to the final consolidation of the United States as a "State" from a State theory point of
view, see HERBERT KROGER, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 7 (1966).

26.

For a fascinating discussion of the struggle over this issue see KARST, supra note 9.
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possible, time and again, to overcome exclusions of existing minorities from
the national community.27 Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment made
it clear that all citizens of the several states are at the same time citizens of
the Union (national citizenship). The principle of equality was also
reaffirmed through the "equal protection clause." Implementation of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the courts led to the enunciation of the normative
principle of equal participation of all citizens in the political, economic,
social, and cultural life of U.S. society ("equal citizenship"). This principle
became the determinative factor in shaping the American Nation. 8
"Equal citizenship" as an empirical concept certainly does not describe
U.S. social reality. But, as a normative concept it forms the core of the
U.S. self-perception. "Equal citizenship," not ethnic belonging, constitutes
the credo of U.S. "civic culture." It is based not only on tolerance of
religious and cultural diversity, individual freedom and responsibility, but
also on assimilation or integration into the citizenry. Responsible citizenship
requires the acceptance and socialization of these highest constitutional
values.
III. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION AND THE NATION-STATE
UNDER CHALLENGE

Whether ethnically oriented or not, the concept of the nation-state, and
particularly the concept of the nation or State people as described before,
faces serious challenges due to a dramatically changed political, economic,
and social environment. First, a great number of States are strongly
involved in globalizing major fields of traditional State activity. Such fields
as markets, law, and politics have become denationalized, in that they are
no longer under the sovereign control of the States concerned.30 This
phenomenon has two implications. On the one hand, the direct legitimation
of State activities through the domestic democratic process becomes indirect
at best, since political decisions of major importance are taken outside the
domestic constitutional setting. On the other hand, globalization not only
means the denationalization of the political decision-making process, but it

27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 179-84, 192-96.
See id. at 54, 173-216.
Id. at 181.
See Delbrack, supra note 2, passim.
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also means that global decisionmaking aims at serving the "public interest"
of the world community, not at satisfying a narrowly (traditionally) defined
"national interest" which, in turn, can (although not necessarily must) lead
to a further alienation between the citizenry and the government of the State
concerned. 3 If the present trend toward globalization of major fields of
traditional State activity persists-and there are strong indications that it
will, or even must, persist in view of the emerging global threat scenarios
(environment, security, and migration) 32 -then the traditional concept of
the nation-state must be reconsidered in at least two respects. First, the
legitimacy of the State, which traditionally rests on the promotion of the
self-defined "national interest," must be based on a different ground of
legitimation. In other words, the in-group oriented traditional concept of
"national interest" has to yield to a concept of an "enlightened self-interest"
that is open to the demands of a "global public interest." Next, the forms
of democratic participation must be extended to the supranational level to
give greater legitimacy to the process of global decisionmaking.33
Second, the traditional nation-state, and particularly the concept of the
nation, are being seriously challenged by a worldwide process of
migration.34 Millions of people are on the move. Some have been driven
out of their home countries because of violent ethnonationalist conflicts that
result in utter destruction, famine, and gross violations of the most basic
human rights, while others have been deprived of their most basic means of
subsistence due to natural disasters or the exhaustion of their country's
natural resources.35 These people-either to be categorized as "refugees"
in the terms of the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951,36 or as displaced
persons or "economic refugees"-are seeking refuge in the more well-to-do
countries. They have become immigrants of a new kind. Some come with

31. Concerns of this kind were voiced in the Maastricht Treaty Case before the German
Constitutional Court, see supra note 1, passim.
32. See Delbriick, supra note 2, 14-19.
33. See Hobe, supra note 22, at 84.
34. For a detailed discussion of these types of challenges to the nation-state, see Aristide R.
Zolberg, ChangingSovereignty Games and InternationalMigration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 153
(1994).
35. For a summary of the present day migration trends, see Jeffrey S. Passel & Michael Fix, US.
Immigration in a Global Context: Past, Present, and Future, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (1994).
36. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
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the middle or long-term intent to return to their home countries. Others
come without any hope of ever returning home; they will become permanent
residents in the State of refuge. This poses the inevitable question: will they
remain aliens in their State of residence or will the principle of "equal
citizenship" apply to them? There are sad indications that "equal citizenship"
is not on the political agenda of most, if not all, States that are exposed to
the effects of global migration.
The ethnic perception of the German nation or State people has been
recently challenged by two major changes in the political environment of
Germany. On the one hand, the close integration of the Member States
within the European Union (EU) increasingly forces Germany to extend civil
and political rights, such as the right to vote in municipal elections, to
citizens of other EU Member States.37 On the other hand, Germany has
become a de facto immigration country. Official statements to the contrary
notwithstanding, out of the approximately 6.5 million aliens (8% of
Germany's total population), a large number (conservative estimates are 2530%) will remain permanently in Germany. In fact, some 80,000 children
have alien parents, quite a few of whom have reached adult age, have
passed through the German school system, and are even well socialized into
the German life-style.3" Yet, considerable parts of the public-although
not the majority-are strongly opposed to Germany's becoming an
immigration country and extending "equal citizenship" to the immigrants.
Right-wing parties are feeding on the anti-alien sentiment. The liberal right
to asylum guaranteed by the Basic Law has been severely curtailed. 9

37. While the European Community Treaty (E.C.T.) guaranteed to the citizens of the EC
Member States the freedoms of movement, establishment, and services, the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union added Union citizenship (art. B para. 3 and art. 8 E.C.T.), the right to vote in municipal
government elections, and the right to participate in European Parliamentary elections in the country of
residence (art. 8b E.C.T.). English text of the Maastricht Treaty in 31 I.L.M. 247.
38. See Klaus Dicke, Ausldnder, in HANDBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN EINHEIT 19 (Werner
Weidenfeld & Karl-Rudolf Korte eds., 1993). Figures on the numbers of aliens in Germany differ: while
the numbers given by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) for 1992 show 5.8
million aliens in the united Germany, the unofficial number for 1993 is 6.8 million, as compared to the
figure of approximately 6.5 million given in the text. On immigration in Germany, see Klaus J. Bade,
Tabu Migration:Belastungen und Herausforderungenin Deutschland, in DAS MANIFEST DER 60, supra
note 8, at 66-85.
39. The Basic Law upholds the right, in principle, to asylum for everyone. By constitutional
amendment of June 28, 1993, however, the new article 16a was introduced into the Basic Law and adds
restrictions to the right to asylum by excluding from the enjoyment of this right all people who come
into Germany from another European Union country or from a third State that recognizes the Geneva
Refugee Convention. See, e.g., [European] Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, Nov. 4,
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France, although less affected by immigration in recent years than
Germany,4 ° has questioned the traditional liberal perception of the nation
as well. Under strong pressure from the right-wing Le Pen movement,
immigration has been severely restricted and the nationality laws have been
revised to the effect that the jus soli principle-a cornerstone of the nonethnic understanding of the concept of the French nation-has been
considerably watered down.4 '
A similar reconsideration of immigration policies has emerged in the
United States. Although immigration has always been subject to close
government control, the status of the U.S. as an immigration country has
never been challenged in principle.42 Yet, in view of the types of
immigrants who are pouring into the country, new questions are being
asked, the most startling one being whether "the boat is full" 4 3-a question
that is light years away from the earlier self-perception as an immigration
country. The rising new mood has had political effects. The right to
asylum has been handled more restrictively in recent years, as in the case
of the Haitian boat people. 44 The identity of the U.S. nation has been
questioned in view of the influx of hundreds of thousands of legal and
illegal immigrants from diverse cultural backgrounds. The notion of

1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (granting of asylum is related to the "safe haven" principle).
40. The number of aliens living in France in 1970-1971 was 2.6 million, as compared to 3
million in Germany. In 1993 these numbers were 3.6 million in France and 6.5-6.8 million in
Germany-an increase by less than 50% in the French case, but by more than 100% in the German case.
See Rainer Mfnz, Rahmenbezug 11: Bevilkerung und Wanderung in Europa, in DAS MANIFEST DER 60,
supra note 8, at 102, 115; see also Hobe, supra note 22, at 60.
41. See Guy de Lusignan, Global Migrationand EuropeanIntegration,2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 179, 185 (1994); Hobe, supra note 22, at 72.
42. See Passel, supra note 35; see also John A. Scanlan, A View from the U.S.-Social,
Economic, and Legal Change, the Persistence of the State, and Immigration Policy in the Coming
Century, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79 (1994).

43. See Refugee Issues to be Focus, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 29, 1992, at 2E (announcing
a forum in Minneapolis entitled, "Is the Boat Full?"); see also Frank D. Bean, Immigration Combatants
Overlook the New Reality, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 29, 1993, at I (Outlook); Arthur C. Helton, Closing
the Golden Door: Anti-Immigration Laws, 256 THE NATION 428 (1993); James Kelly, Closing the
Golden Door, TIME, May 18, 1981, at 24; Maria Puente, Immigration 'Issue of the 90s, USA TODAY,
Sept. 30, 1993, at 10A. Passel & Fix, supra note 35, have shown that the concerns with regard to
negative impacts of continued high level immigration on the economy, particularly the job market, and
on government spending are actually unfounded. But a sense of a failing U.S. immigration policy seems
to persist in the public-a similar phenomenon can be observed in Germany, where anti-alien feelings
run high in view of a seemingly out-of-hand influx of aliens. Tightened control of the borders and
restrictive asylum policies have considerably reduced the public outrage.
44. Art Pine, New Policy Cited as Exodus of HaitiansAbates, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1994, at Al;
Gray Admits Race Affects Haiti Policy, BALTIMORE SUN, July I1, 1994, at 3A.
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"Uberfremdung"--common coin in Europe-seems to have become a
marketable notion in the United States as well.45
If these observations lead to the conclusion that the traditional notion of
an ethnically and culturally integrated homogeneous nation is no longer
viable in view of the worldwide migration, then the question becomes
whether this notion of the nation-state has become obsolete as well. This
obsolescence appears to be inevitable unless we can offer a concept of the
nation-state that does not depend on the traditional perception of the concept
of the nation. This concept must allow for the State to remain an integrated
community of citizens who find identification and shelter within it, but
which must also accommodate a culturally and ethnically diverse citizenry.
European nations have a long way to go towards this concept of an "Open
Republic," as does the United States-at least in real terms.
IV. THE "OPEN REPUBLIC"-A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE
TRADITIONAL NATION-STATE?

A. The Concept of the "Open Republic" v. The Concept of the "NationState": The Present Debate

The concept of the "Open Republic" aims at an effective form of
political organization of societies. Its integrating strength comes from its
commitment to freedom, equality, brother-sisterhood, the recognition of
human dignity, and from its commitment to "government by the people" and
"government of the people by law" within the "Confederation of Republican
States."
Critics of.such a concept argue that it simply amounts to what one may

call "constitutional patriotism" or an abstract intellectual construct of "world
citizenship" in disguise.47

The true and forceful State-so goes the

45. "OLberfremdung" translates as -the "fear of over-foreignization." Germany: Ambassador,
Symbol and Scold, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1993, at 53. See, e.g., Bob Dart, Groundswell Rising
Against Illegal Aliens, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 19, 1993, at A8; Suzanne Espinosa and Benjamin
Pimentel, Anger at Immigration Overflow, S.F. CHRON., Aug, 27, 1993, at AI; Tony Freemantle, AntiImmigration Sentiment Rises, HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 1993, at Al; Paul Glastris, Immigration
Crackdown, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 21, 1993, at 34.
46. See Kant, supra note 11, at 208.
47. For a rather conspicuous and bad example, see Helmut Wagner, "Verfassungspatriotismus"
als negativer Nationalismus, in 44 AUBENPOLITIK 243 (1993); cf Habermas, supra note 20, at 193 (for
a critical view of this neo-nationalist line of thinking).

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:45

argument-must be based on strong ethnonational, cultural, and/or religious
ties. The failures of multiethnic State constructs in the past (AustroHungary, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) are cited as examples. 8 The
rising tide of ethnonationalist movements is held to be strong evidence that
the natural bonds of ethnic, cultural, or religious kinship are the true driving
forces of history. These critics overlook that the nation-state they envisage
is a rather recent phenomenon.4 ' Thus, history will not come to an end if
the traditional nation-state gives way to other forms of political organization
of societies. More importantly, the critics overlook the close connection
between the demand for the "Open Republic" and the irreversibly growing
recognition of universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.5 0 This
is a much stronger challenge, which cuts at the roots of the traditional,
exclusive, and in-group oriented nation-state. If there is any future for the
State as the form of political organization of societies, it is the "Open
Republic" that possesses the problem-solving capacity needed in the
globalizing political environment of the closing of the twentieth century and
the beginning of the twenty-first. In the following sections, the concept of
the "Open Republic" will be set out in more detail and critically appraised.
Apart from signifying a non-monarchical form of government, the term
"republic" has been the subject of widely differing interpretations.
However, beginning from antiquity, the term "republic" has been related to
the idea of the "good State" or "good government."' In determining the

48. Wagner, supra note 47; Benjamin Barber, Global Democracy or Global Law: Which Comes
First?, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 123 (1993).
49. The modem territorial State emerged in a prolonged process from the crumbling medieval
order and was legally recognized in the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648. See GEORG DAHM ET AL.,
V6LKERRECHT 4 (2d ed. 1989). The territorial State as a nation-state is an even younger phenomenon
dating back to the French Revolution of 1789 and its aftermath.
50. See Klaus Dicke, Die der Person innewohnende Warde und die Frage der Universalitat der
Menschenrechte, in WORDE UND RECHT DES MENSCHEN 161, 161-82 (Heiner Bielefeldt et al. eds., 1992);
Jost Delbriick, Universalisierung des Menschenrechtsschutzes: Aspekte der Begriindung und
Durchsetzbarkeit, in WELTORDNUNG ODER CHAOS? 511 (A. Zunker ed., 1993).
51. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS 64 (E.H. Warmington ed., 1928).

"Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo
modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus." ("Well,
then, a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people is not any collection of human beings
brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an

agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the commmon good.") Id. For a discussion of
the notion of the "republic," see generally Josef Isensee, Republik-Sinnpotential eines Begriffs, 36
JURISTENZEITUNG 1 (1981); 1 KLAUS STERN, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
575 (1989).
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meaning of the "republican idea" or "republicanism," the works of the
writers of the Enlightenment have been particularly important. They greatly
influenced the Founding Fathers of the United States and have a continuing
2
impact on U.S. political theory.
However, differences as to the "true" interpretation of the "republican
idea" and, thus, of the understanding of the U.S. Constitution, have
developed, particularly in the recent past.5 3 A comprehensive overview of
this debate cannot be given at this point. Suffice it to say that two major
schools of thought have confronted each other. Considering the origin of
the modem "republican idea" from the time of the Enlightenment, each in
its own way has led to rather narrow interpretations of the "republican
54
idea."
On the one hand, republicanism is often charged with rigidifying the
political system by dogmatizing the republican notions of the Founding
Fathers as the expression of the inalienable and unchangeable "republican
idea." This one-sided fixation on State ideology as the integrating force of
the nation is seen as leading to an authoritarian attitude vis-A-vis dissenting
minorities. On the other hand, representatives of the "original intent"
approach charge their critics with hanging onto a liberalist destruction of the
substantive content of republicanism, promoting an individualistic
fragmentation of the community of citizens, and ultimately taking a relativist
stance towards the highest, "original" constitutional values.5 5

52. Recent historical research has corrected earlier assumptions that John Locke was the
exclusive, or at least dominant, authority followed by the Founding Fathers. Besides a variety of religious
influences, a broad spectrum of "republican thought" entered U.S. constitutional deliberations. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary: What is Republicanism, and is it Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1695 (1988-89) (with rich references to earlier and recent literature on the subject); see also J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACCHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).

FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC

53. See Fallon, supra note 52; Kathym Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591
(1988); Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-OrThe Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633
(1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988).
54. See Michelman, supra note 53, passim; see also Fallon, supra note 52, passim (critiquing
Professor Michelman's interpretation of the "republican idea").
55. This debate closely resembles the "liberalism--communitarianism" debate as documented
in MULTIKULTURALISMUS UND DIE POLITIK DER ANERKENNUNG, supra note 20, with commentary by

Jirgen Habermas added to the German edition of the book. See also KOMMUNITARISMUS: EINE DEBATTE
OBER DIE MORALISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN MODERNER GESELLSCHAFTEN (Axel Honneth ed., 1993). Within
the framework of this debate, compare MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (taking a rather
restrictive view on the questions of alien citizens) with Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case
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Most recently, however, some authors have criticized the polarization of
interpretations of republicanism as tending to obscure and even distort the
basic elements of the "republican idea." These authors call for a return to
the constitutive elements of republicanism (i.e., the "government by the
people" and the "government of the people by law" or the "government of
laws not men") and its liberal values. But, at the same time, this return to
the core elements of republicanism must be accompanied by a thorough
reflection on these elements in light of the conditions of modem societies.56
Without subscribing to everything uttered in the specific U.S. debate, the
result of a reflection on the constitutive elements of what a republican State
in our time ought to be basically resembles the notion of the "Open
Republic" as it is put forth in this paper.
B. The "Open Republic "-Conceptand Structure
The first of the undisputed elements of the republican State is
constitutional government, "government by law not men" (Rechts- und
Verfassungsstaatlichkeit), the Kantian notion of the lawfully constituted
society that is the sole guarantee of individual freedom.57 The constitution
and the laws set limits on the political majority and thus prevent it from
becoming tyrannical.
The second element is democratic participation of all citizens in the
government, particularly in constitution-making and law-making, producing
a "government by the people." However, at least on the level of the pouvoir
constituant, there is a tension between the principles of democracy and
constitutional government: if the citizenry, the people, is taken as sovereign,
the question arises as to how this sovereignty is compatible with the
principle of "government of laws not men." The citizenry, as pouvoir
constituant, is not free from the temptation to abuse this power.5 " If one
wants to avoid such abuse of power through the use of constitutional
for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251 (1987) (critiquing Walzer's position from a more liberal standpoint).
56. A lead figure in this respect is Professor Michelman. See Michelman, supra note 53; Frank
1. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 24-36 (1986). With regard to the freedom-securing dimension of the "republic," Michelman
rightly refers himself to Kant, see 8 KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN, WERKAUSGABE 462 (Wilhelm
Weischedel ed., 1977).
57. See KANT, supra note 56.
58. See Michelman, supra note 53, at 1501.
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restraints, the question, then, is where the constitution draws the legitimation
to attach such restraints to the sovereign people. Constitutional judicial
review by an independent third branch of government does not solve the
problem because-the sovereignty argument brought to its logical end-this
third branch of government is at the disposition of the sovereign will of the
people as well. If the judiciary were not at the disposition of the sovereign
people, it would, in fact (or rather in law), not be sovereign. The judiciary
would be an external authority whose legitimacy could not be drawn from
the consent of the people in cases of conflict. The State practice of modem
constitutional democracies is replete with examples of this dilemma.59
There is no logically sound solution to the tension between constitutional
government and popular sovereignty. The most convincing, pragmatic
approach is to assume that in drafting the constitution the sovereign pouvoir
constituant accepted a permanent self-restraint on its sovereignty in the
sense that it is forbidden for the sovereign to abuse its powers. This selfrestraint, in turn, gives constitutional judicial review its legitimacy as the
protector of the constitution.
Exactly at this point, the conflict that underlies the U.S. debate over
"true" republicanism comes into play. For, even if one accepts the
assumption of self-restraint by the pouvoir constituant,the question of its
legitimizing effect over the course of time arises. In other words, the
question is how an interpretation of the substantive meaning of the selfimposed restraints on the sovereign people is possible that still respects
changing social conditions in a given State. Indeed, the resulting
understanding of the constitution may become authoritarian or intolerant of
changing value orientations once accepted restraints are identified with the
"original intent." This result would be incompatible with the republican
idea of "government by the people" or with the idea of self-determination
of a self-conscious citizenry under the conditions of modem society. In a
time of rapid social change, the "republic" must prove itself as adaptable,
as "open."

59. An illustrative example of this tension between the limitations of the constitutions and the
legislative branches of government in the United States and in Germany is that of the constitutionally
protected right to privacy or a woman's right to individual self-determination with regard to abortion,
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the constitutionally protected right to life of the embryo,
protection of which traditionally has been seen to be the duty of the State-a notion that presently does
not seem to be shared by a majority of the people of the two nations.
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At this point the third element of republicanism comes into play: the
notion of the "marketplace of ideas."' The liberal republic is designed to
serve as a forum for an open and public discourse. Such discourse operates
as, at the least, an indirect instrument of social change within the given
constitutional framework and, in this sense, exercises a function of
constitutional policymaking and, ultimately, of molding the constitution
itself.6 ' However, open and public discourse can only have this effect if
it allows for the articulation of the diverse opinions within the society,
including those of minorities. Only then can the discourse truly exercise its
integrating force for all groups of society.62
At this juncture, we may return to the core of the preceding
considerations-the character and perception of the nation, and the State
people of the "Open Republic." Based on the observations set out in the
preceding paragraph, one must conclude that every person who is ready to
accept the basic principles of republican government can be a citizen of the
"Open Republic." The "Open Republic," in order to achieve "openness,"
must commit itself to "equal citizenship" for all people. Ethnic, racial, and
religious criteria cannot determine who may be a citizen of the "Open
Republic." "Openness" to accepting citizens of different ethnic, religious,
or cultural backgrounds and to giving them equal rights is a constitutive
element of the "Open Republic." This requires us to accept the fourth
element of republicanism: tolerance, respectfor others being different, and
the readiness of each person to let herself or himself be enriched in her or
his own personal development by the social diversity around her or him.
Furthermore, the fourth element of republicanism demands integration of the
diverse ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural entities of a given society into
one "nation," and this means assimilation to a certain degree. Habermas,
in his recent contribution to this debate, has suggested that the level of
political socialization, that is, assimilation,63 and integration into one nation

60.

See Klaus Dicke, "The Market Place of Ideas" und der Menschenrechtliche Gehalt der

Meinungsfreiheit, in MEINUNGSFREIHEIT-GRUNDGEDANKEN UND GESCHICHTE IN EUROPA UND USA 65,

65-64 (Johannes Schwartlhnder & Dietmar Willoweit eds., 1986). Fallon overlooks the fact that the
topos of the marketplace of ideas and the law-creating force of the political discourse find firm ground
in the "republican idea." Fallon, supra note 52, at 1727 (critiquing Professor Michelman's theory).
61. See Michelman, supra note 53, at 1513, 1531-37.
62. See KARST, supra note 9, at 31. With regard to this conceptualization of an integration of
the people by the political discourse, see Habermas, supra note 20,passim; Habermas, Staatsblrgerschaft
und nationale Identifikation, in FAKTIZTAT unD GELTUNG 632 (Habermas ed., 1992).
63. "Assimilation" in this context means that the protection of cultural and religious identity
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has to be separated from the level of protection of ethnicity or other
identifying criteria of groups of people.'
In other words, the "Open
Republic" demands that we learn and exercise republican virtues to develop
the "civic culture" and, under its shelter or umbrella, to respect diversity at
the same time-e pluribus unum! 5 The "Open Republic" thus appears to
be not a static form of government but rather a continuous demanding task
for modern civilizing societies-a "konkrete Utopie" (a concrete Utopian
scheme) promoted by an effective but constitutionally restrained
government.
V. THE "OPEN REPUBLIC" AND THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES
OF THE FUTURE

The second part of this paper has outlined a number of the challenges
that confront the State as the dominant form of political organization of
societies today.66 It also has contended that the State as such will not
become obsolete, but that major aspects of the traditional (ethno-) national
State will have to be reconsidered. One of these major aspects concerns the
notion of the "State people" (nation), which has to undergo far-reaching
changes or adaptations. The citizenry has to learn to accept diversity, which
means that the concept of the integrated body politic must be restricted to
the level of constitutional values and political decision-making. On the
sublevel of group identities, cultural, as well as religious diversity and
multiethnicity must be respected. Another major aspect concerns the State,
the "Open Republic," which must make internal openness effective on the
international and global level. This means that, in order to live up to the
standard of unity in diversity, the "Open Republic" must work constructively
within the "Federation of Republican States." The "Open Republic" is
structurally and conceptually able to achieve this because of its very
"'openness."

must find its limits where it leads to the fragmentation or even segregation of the political community
of citizens (i.e., the republican nation). In other words, "assimilation," or rather political socialization,
is legitimate as far as it is necessary to assure the development of a civic culture as the integrating force
of the nation of the "Open Republic." See Habermas, supra note 20, at 184; see also KARST, supra note
9, at 31.
64. See Habermas, supra note 20, at 177.
65. See KARST, supra note 9, at 181.
66. See supra part II.
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The concrete conclusions that can be drawn from this summary of the
character and structure of the "Open Republic" can be described as follows:
- The "Open Republic" is capable of defining a national "public
interest"-which is not selfishly restricted to immediate concerns of
the given State and nation-without fear of losing legitimacy on the
part of the citizenry.
- The "Open Republic" is committed to and capable of carrying out
its obligations within the community of States in meeting global
challenges in the fields of economic and social development,
migration, the environment, and the maintenance of peace and
security. Commitments of national resources can be defined
according to the needs of the public interest of the community of
States, which involves a commitment to institutional and global
cooperation and a rejection of unilateralism.
- The "Open Republic," in order to fulfill these obligations
internally and externally, must and can be a strong State, but one
guided by the rule of law and constitutional principles; in other
words, a res publica heeding the "bonum commune" (the public
good or the "common weal") internally and externally.
Today's leading political class-practitioners, theorists, and
educators-has been challenged by the younger generation in recent years
with regard to the older generation's lack of a grand vision that could entice
young people to commit themselves to moving from the traditional and
culturally limited nation-state to a diverse and integrated "Open Republic."
The "Open Republic," if taken seriously as described, could constitute such
a grand vision if people-both young and old-were willing to recognize
the challenge posed by the concept of the "Open Republic": to secure equal
citizenship for all and thereby to honor human dignity, which is the basis of
any humane and civil society.

